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Preface
Civil Wars and Imperial Wars
I circulated a draft paper in February 1989 with the title "South
Africa's Civil War: Revolution and Counter-Revolution". It had
two parts, one called "Resistance and Repression", the other
"South Africa's Common Society". Together they made out a case
for identifying the struggle as a civil war arising out of a
revolutionary situation.
The terms are complementary, not contradictory. A civil war by
definition is an armed conflict between combatants who are
citizens of the same state, belong to the same society, and take
up arms in a struggle for political power. *• The most bitter and
ruinous war of the last century was the civil war fpught in the
United States in 1861/2 between the slave-owning Confederacy and
the Union of free labour states.2
A South African example of an imperial war was Britain's war of
1899-1902 against the Boer republics, fought by an aggressive
power to establish control over the whole of Southern Africa in
keeping with the ambition of Cecil John Rhodes (1852-1902) to
paint the map red from Cape to Cairo.
An Historical Footnote
The idea of a common South African society is as old as the
African National Congress. Founded on January 8, 1912, it set
out to unite all African tribes in defense of their rights and
privileges. The overriding issue was the South African Act of
Union which took effect on 32 May, 1910. Drafted by an all-White
National Convention in 1908/9, and adopted by the British
parliament in 1909, the Act prohibited Africans, Coloureds and
Indians from sitting in parliament and gave them the vote only in
the Cape Province.
"When translated into practice this Act meant the
repression of all Blacks in every conceivable form; it
was used to curtail African freedom of movement; to deny
the Blacks rights of trading in their areas; to cripple
their education and generally to deny them basic human
rights and chances of equality of opportunity in
economic development, cultural welfare and social
advance."3
This passage has been taken from a booklet issued by the A. N. C.
to celebrate its 70th anniversary. Its President, Oliver Tambo,
marked the occasion with a message calling for Freedom, Equality
and Democracy. In his words:
"The African National Congress of South Africa has
remained faithful to the cause of Freedom. It leads the
national struggle for the emancipation of all oppressed
and exploited Black people. It stands for a new order
in South Africa where racism shall be a thing of the
past and human dignity and equality shall prevail in the
life of our country."4
His words echoed the message of Chief Albert Luthuli (1898-1967),
the President-General of the A.N.C., to its annual congress in
December 16-19, 1959, the last one held before it was outlawed in
1960. In anticipation of the ban, the Chief wrote on May 28,
1957 to the Prime Minister, "Baasskap Strydom", suggesting a
multi-racial convention to seek a solution to the country's
pressing problems. Apart from a curt, formal acknowledgment by
Strydom' s private secretary, saying that the contents had been
noted, the government ignored the proposal. Yet the letter
contained profound observations on the nature of the South
African Society which deserved close scrutiny by the head of
government. Chief Lutuli was a deeply religious Christian, the
recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, 1961, and widely
esteemed within South Africa and abroad for his positive
contribution to the concept of a common society , a theme that
figured prominently in his letter to Strydom, as the following
excerpts reveal.
"...Congress believes in a common society and holds that
citizens of a country, regardless of their colour, have
the right to full participation in government and in the
control of their future {at p. 38).
Firstly, we believe in a common society because we
honestly hold that anything to the contrary unduly works
against normal human behaviour, for the gregarious
nature of man enables him to flourish to his best (in)
association with others who cherish lofty ideals.
Apartheid, so far, has revealed itself as an attempt by
White South Africa to shunt the African off the tried,
civilised road by getting him to glorify unduly his
tribal past.
Secondly, we believe that the close spiritual and moral
contact facilitated by a common society structure in one
nation makes it easier to develop friendship and mutual
respect and understanding among various groups in a
nation; this is especially valuable in a multi-racial
nation like ours and these qualities...are a sine qua
non to the building of a truly united nation from a
heterogeneous society.
Lastly, we hold the view that the concept of a common
society conforms more than does apartheid to early
traditional closer Black-White contact...Christian
teachings and the education that accompanied it.
Strongly holding as we do to the views I have just
stated, you will appreciate, Sir, with what heartfelt
concern, alarm and disappointment we learnt recently
from Press reports that the Government intends banning
the African National Congress and arresting 2,000 more
of its members... such an action would serve to increase
the dangerous gulf that exists between the Government
and the African people and, in particular, those African
leaders who have knowledge of social and economic forces
at work in the modern South Africa of today and the
world in general {at 39).
My people crave an opportunity to work for a great
United South Africa in which they can fully develop
their personalities and capabilities to the fullest with
the rest of the country's population in the interests of
the country as a whole."5
Two years later, the Sharpeville Massacre gave the regime the
excuse it wanted. Acting under the Public Safety Act of 1953, it
declared a state of emergency, outlawed the A.N.C. and P.A.C.,
and detained without trial some 20 000 active members of the
Resistance.
The Public Safety Act and General Laws Amendment Act of 1953 were
introduced to suppress the campaign for the Defiance of Unjust
Laws launched by the A.N.C. and South African Indian Congress on
June 26, 1952. It continued through 1953. Early in 1955 the
A.N.C. began an organised attempt to bring people together in a
Congress to voice their demands. From this emerged the Freedom
Charter, formally adopted on June 26, 1955. Its opening sentence
dramatically claimed that "South Africa belongs to all who live
in it, Black and White, and...no government can justly claim
authority unless it is based on the will of the people". In 1956
the government began the Great Treason Trial, with the Freedom
Charter its centerpiece. The trial ended in 1961 with the
acquittal of the accused.
I too was a political prisoner, detained under the emergency
regulations imposed in 1960. While in prison, I wrote a piece on
the structure of South Africa's common society. Shortly after my
release, I spoke on the same topic at a NUSAS conference in the
University of Cape Town, where I taught Comparative African Law
and Government in the School of African Studies. 1 claimed that
the concept corresponded to reality and provided useful insights
into relations between Black and White South Africans.7
Z K Matthews,8 formerly professor of Social Anthropology, Native
Law and Administration at Fort Hare, tackled the same theme in a
more elaborate study , entitled "Social Relations In A Common
South African Society". Close co-operation between Black and
White, he pointed out, was a daily occurrence at places of work
in mines, factories and farms, as well as schools and
institutions of higher learning. Integration was as much a part
of South Africa's tradition as segregation and apartheid, and had
a far higher moral content.
He made two points that are relevant to our immediate situation.
The South African constitution, drawn up by Whites only, was
based on the assumption of the permanent political subordination
of non-Whites. The time was overdue, he claimed, for a new
constitution to be drawn up by representatives of all sections of
the population in a national convention in which the rights of
all could be adequately safeguarded (at p. 23-24).
The other argument worth repeating appears on p.26. "The time
has come" he wrote, "for us to abandon the policy of compulsory
apartheid as something that has been tried and found wanting, and
substitute it for a policy which frankly recognises the
interdependence and the necessity for co-operation between the
different sectors of our population on a basis of equality".
His concluding message was that through co-operation over a long
period of time, Black and White were inextricably bound together
in a fundamental spiritual sense. Any policy "based on the
assumption that White and non-White in South Africa belong not to
one country but to two or more entirely different worlds, is
fundamentally wrong for South Africa both on historical and
practical grounds" f at p.27).
The Integrationists
Chief Luthuli, President Tambo, Professor Z K Matthews and their
small band of adherents proved to be correct, morally and
scientifically. They had to wait forty years for an official
vindication of their belief in a common society; but President de
Klerk's surprising announcement on February 2, 1990, was a
culmination of pressures, struggles and resistance to oppression
foreseen by integrationists during the preceding half century.
Interdependence, the keystone of the common society concept, was
fully demonstrated in spite of attempts by the apartheid regime
to keep Africans out of the urban-industrial complex by means of
pass laws, influx control, police raids and arrests, numbering
more than 74 000 a year in 1981. The government looked down on
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urban Africans as temporary residents who should return to
bantustans. Dr Koornhof, the Minister of Co-operation and
Development, told the Cape National Party Congress in 1982 that
African urbanisation would be checked by influx control laws and
urbanisation of rural areas.9
A more truthful approach was put forward by Dr van Zyl Slabbert,
leader of the Progressive Federal Party (P.F.P). The
"inevitability of urbanisation had to be accepted", he said, "and
attention turned to deploying resources to accommodate a growing
number of people in the urban areas rather than, as under the
Nationalist government, of forcibly trying to keep them in
poverty in the rural areas. Housing policy would have to be
dramatically revised and land and essential services made
available by the state to assist people to build houses."10
P W Botha's Reforms
The National Party (N.P.) scored a two-thirds majority in a
referendum of White voters held on 2 November 198 3 to approve a
new constitution. The official opposition, the Conservative Party
(C.P.), the Herstigte Nasionale Party (H.N.P) and the banned
A.N.C. called for a "no vote". The Coloured Labour Party
objected to the exclusion of Africans, but said it would
participate in a proposed Coloured chamber. Opposition on the
extra-parliamentary front gave rise to the birth of the United
Democratic Front (U.D.F.) representing a wide range of local
organisations.
A bill containing the new constitution was introduced to
parliament in May 1983. On the 22 September the Republic of South
Africa Constitution Act, 1983 became law. It provided for an
electoral college of White, Indian and Coloured members of
parliament to elect the president, who became both head of state
and head of government.
The new parliament consisted of a White House of Assembly with
178 members, a Coloured House of Representatives (85 members) and
an Indian House of Delegates (45 members). The "control and
administration of Black affairs (were) vested in the State
President". F W de Klerk, Minister of Internal Affairs and
member of the cabinet committee said that the N.P. rejected the
notion of a fourth chamber for Africans. It was "nonsense" to
suggest that they should be given political rights outside their
own tribal groups.ll
Mr de Klerk's appointment had taken place during a cabinet
reshuffle in 1982, necessitated by a split in the N.P. 's
parliamentary caucus which resulted in the expulsion of Dr
Treurnicht and 16 MPs who followed him. They launched the C. P-
in Pretoria with a programme aimed at excluding Africans, Indians
and Coloureds from political rights in "White" South Africa,
removing them physically to their "homelands", and enforcing
strict apartheid measures against Africans, including the repeal
of measures granting them rights of permanent residence outside
the bantustans.
Africans Revolt
The widely publicised debates on the tri-cameral constitution
were an excellent form of political education. Africans in
particular were alerted to the great injustice inflicted on them.
Their exclusion from the new parliament stirred them to anger
beyond anything seen before. The explosion came in 1985 in the
form of school boycotts, stay-aways, strikes, consumer boycotts
and outbreaks of violence between Inkatha and the U.D.F. in
Natal, and between the U.D.F. and the Azanian People's
Organisation (AZAPO) in the Eastern Cape.
Each side to the conflict blamed the other, Inkatha saying that
the U.D.F. had entered space in Northern Natal around
Pietermaritzburg which rightly fell within its sphere of
influence, while AZAPO continued to blame the A.N.C. for violence
in the townships dating from 1983.*
P W Botha, the State President, responded to the revolt by
declaring a state of emergency on 21 July, 1985 in some districts
and after various fluctuations imposing it on the whole country,
exclusive of the various "independent" bantustans, on 12 June,
1986. The national state of emergency was reimposed in June 198 7
and again in June 1988.
States of Emergency (S.O.E.)
South Africa's first national state of emergency was imposed in
1960 after the Sharpeville Massacre, followed by the ban of the
A.N.G. and P.A.C. The S.O.E. is a form of military rule, familiar
in times of war, revolutions and resistance to foreign armies of
occupation. The South African variant comes into effect by a
proclamation issued in the name of the State President and valid
for 12 months renewable with parliament's approval for another
year at a time.
* AZAPO's national congress, which met in Langa, Cape
Town, on 22-23 December, 1990, heard a report by a
commission on the causes of violence. It alleged the
violence resulted from intolerance and a bid by the
A.N.C. to impose its political hegemony; secondly, the
lack of political education among the youth; thirdly
provocative songs, graffiti and slogans which portrayed
every youth as a member of SAYCO or SANSCO; stay-aways
and school boycott campaigns enforced by intimidation.
Regulations issued under S.O.E. proclamations include many
repressive measures already held by the State Security Forces
(S.S.F.), and new ones added at will. The heart of the matter is
government by executive decree, making parliament a rubber stamp,
overriding the rule of law, and giving every policeman, prison
warder and soldier arbitrary powers of arrest and detention
without warrant. An indemnity clause protects them against
claims for damages arising from their unlawful acts. The S.O.E.
gives authorities a free hand, license to do as they please
without being held responsible to the people or the courts.
Official lawlessness, the concentration of total power in the
hands of the executive, and an all White judiciary are bastions
of a despotic racial autocracy. Its instruments are policemen,
soldiers and courts of law.
The Police
The South African Police (S.A.P.) celebrated its 7 5th anniversary
in 1988. In a White Paper tabled in parliament to celebrate the
event, the Minister of Law and Order, Mr Adrian Vlok, referred to
the isolation of the S.A.P. from the general public, the
hostility towards them, and the image presented by South Africa's
enemies to the world of police being unapproachable, unfriendly
and oppressive.12 The authorised establishment of the S.A.P. at
30 June, 1986 was 30 067 White posts, 2 5 167 Black, the actual
numerical strength being 2 6 4 63 and 22 458 respectively. All
members of the force could sit examinations for the ranks of
sergeant, warrent officer and lieutenant, and compete for
promotion on equal terms. The highest rank held by Blacks was
that of colonel, of whom there were only three Blacks, one
Coloured, one Asian and one African. White policemen served
under Black officers at some centers.
Black police officers have improved their status and salaries in
the past fifty years, but not in the important area of public
relations. The Police Commission of Inquiry of 193713 reported
that "an attitude of mutual distrust, suspicion and dislike"
existed between the police and Blacks. The constant raids to
enforce taxes, pass and liquor laws, the invasion of private
homes and the use of force had a brutalising effect on the
police. Their arrogance cultivated a submissive spirit in the
African, coupled with a "sullen and resentful attitude". African
policemen, who took their cue from White superiors, were
"inclined to assault Africans before and after arrest" .
Contributory factors were the low standard of school education of
White recruits and the illiteracy of Africans, who were usually
unable to read or write. This was a poor foundation on which to
build, and the training programme for recruits did little to cure
the defects. The Police Act of 1912 authorised the use of force
in war or civil disturbances. Recruits were consequently taught
drill, musketry and other military subjects at the expense of
instruction in police regulations and law.
The vices noted half a century ago persist and come to the
surface in times of civil strife. A case in point is the
shooting of 281 Africans at Sebokeng on March 26, 1990. Eleven
were killed and almost half the number wounded were shot from
behind. Mr Justice Goldstone,*4 who inquired into the massacre,
reported that the riot police had used force in excess of "any
lawful object sought to be attained". They had opened fire with
shotguns, indifferent to the effects on victims and township
inhabitants. He recommended that the "special constables",
Africans attached to the regular police after eight weeks
training and without educational requirements, should be
Withdrawn from riot control. Eighteen of the 30 policemen
involved in the Sebokeng shootings were special constables.
Police Auxiliaries
The findings of the Goldstone Commission reinforced the claim
that police complicity was a key factor behind the carnage which
had caused the death of more than 500 people during eleven days
in October 1990 in Transvaal townships. As revolutionary
violence mounted, the S.A.P. increased its dependence on
auxiliaries drawn from the African, Coloured and Indian
communities. The Police Reserve, consisting of retired members
of the force, had a strength of close on 19 000, of whom 4 055
were Black, at 30 June, 1986. The Reserve Police Force, made up
of civilian volunteers, had 14 300 White and 4 232 Black
members.* 3
In September 1986, the S.A.P. recruited African men aged 2 5 to
45 for a crash course of three weeks in police duties, at the end
of which they were posted with the same powers of arrest and
detention as the regular police, who underwent a training course
of 12 months. The special constables, known as "kitskonstabels"
(instant police) were employed to assist in keeping order in
African townships, much to the annoyance of the residents, who
objected to being bossed around by poorly trained, sham policemen
in tense situations where violence often resulted from
provocative acts by security forces.
The duration of the course was extended to six weeks,
concentrated at the Koeberg training center in the Western Cape.
The men's wages remained at the figure of R13 a day, the same as
the original starting wage. Complaints of being underpaid and
badly treated were dismissed as ill-founded, the men in charge
claiming that the special constables were merely temporary
workers, and therefore were not entitled to welfare benefits.
"Exploited, underpaid and isolated from their communities", they
stood "in the front line of conflict between the state and the
Black townships. Many of them claimed that their White
commanders treated them in racist and abusive ways".16
Despite their complaints, more than 5 000 kitskonstabels had been
trained and deployed by the end of February, 1989. Derrick
Fine,17 who has written perceptively about the training,
discipline, conduct and control, is of the opinion that
"kitskonstabels are neither competent nor fit and proper persons
to carry their powers, functions and duties."
The University of Cape Town's Institute of Criminology came to a
similar conclusion. It accused the special constables of taking
part in a systematic abuse of power and unlawful conduct. They
have much in common with municipal police and vigilantes, and
like them are unacceptable in the community. The Institute
expressed the views of many critics in the following comment:
"An accountable police force that enjoys the support of
the mass of the people, can surely only be established
and operate in a democratic political environment. That
is why it is significant that the demand for the
withdrawal of troops and para-military police forces
from the townships, has been set as one of the
preconditions for negotiations between the government
and the African National Congress." (at p. 45)
Black Municipal Police
The A.N.C.'s revolutionary slogan of making White South Africa
ungovernable posed a formidable challenge to the apartheid
regime. One of the government's counter measures was to put
Africans in charge of township administration, give them
executive powers and authorise them to appoint municipal police.
By 1988 more than 10 000 municipal police had been recruited and
attached to some 250 township councils throughout the country.
The S.A.P. began by undertaking their training and the payment of
their wages, leaving supervision to the councils, but gradually
assumed full control because residents and senior police officers
complained that Black municipal policemen committed serious
crimes, ranging from murder, rape, robbery and theft to an
illegal use of fire arms. The last straw was the participation
by municipal policemen in strikes of local authority workers in
townships along the Witwatersrand.19
Amendments to the Police Act in 1989 placed the African municipal
police firmly under the control of the S.A.P., who had the right
to appoint, train, promote, dismiss and discipline them. They do
not have full powers under S.O.E. regulations, but are limited to
the right of entry, search and seizure, whereas kitskonstabels
have powers of arrest and detention.
The growing dependence of state security on African police
auxiliaries and quasi-military units reflected a change in the
balance of forces. Heavily armed, mechanised troops operating in
rebellious townships managed to drive the resistance underground.
Deaths due to political violence in 1988 numbered 1150, a 74%
increase on the deaths recorded in 1987, but an 11% decrease on
the number of such deaths in 1986.20 A great majority of the
deaths, amounting to 79% in 1988, took place in Natal. 2 1
Elsewhere cases of political violence decreased, and the S.A.D.F.
withdrew most of its troops from townships, replacing them with
special constables, municipal police and vigilantes.
Vigilantes
The word is used in South Africa to describe loosely organised
bands of Africans carrying clubs, sticks and sometimes guns in
townships and bantustans. "Although they receive no official
recognition, they are politically directed in the sense that they
act to neutralise individuals and organisations opposed to the
apartheid state and its institutions."22
Vigilante groups emerged in latter half of 1985 as violent
conflict increased within African communities. Some groups were
formed to protect local councillors and their families against
attacks by militants opposed to apartheid structures. Others
operated in several bantustans with passive connivance or under
the direct instruction of homeland authorities. Another type
consisted of groups formed in Coloured and Indian areas
threatened by attacks from neighbouring African settlements.23
The leaders are community councillors, municipal police and
homeland chiefs, members of an emerging African middle class.
The S.A.P. supports them materially or with a nod of approval in
times of violent clashes. There is evidence that police officers
have at times allowed the gangs to obtain and carry guns without
permits. By October 1988, more than 90% of unrest-related deaths
were caused by vigilante and counter-vigilante violence, symptoms
of a low level civil war and the militarization of the country's
civil society.
Across the Colour Line
When the center ceases to hold, marginal communities look to
their own resources for defense of life and property. Natal
Indians, mindful of the tragic attacks by Africans at Cato Manor
in 1949, and sensitive to the contrast between wealth and
poverty, tend to regard Africans as "anti-Indian", and themselves
as masters employing African servants.24 Such memories were
revived during the outbreaks of violence in 1983-85, when
Africans, excluded from the tri-cameral parliament and resentful
of the privileges conceded to Indians and Coloureds, attacked and
looted Indian shops and homes. Indian residents formed vigilante
10
groups to patrol the areas under attack and co-operated closely
with the p o l i c e and m i l i t a r y . Af r i cans were a t t a c k e d
i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y , and some Indians were put on t r i a l for
murder.2 5
On 18 November 1985 violence broke out in African townships in
Queenstown, Eastern Cape, after police had disrupted a meeting of
the local civic association. Residents of Aloeville, a Coloured
township in Queenstown, formed a v i g i l a n t e group following
attacks on houses in the township and obtained police permission
to organise the f i r s t Coloured vo lun tee r commando u n i t ,
cons is t ing of 400 men. Vigi lantes went on the offensive,
attacking Africans indiscriminately and harassing U.D.F. members
without police intervention.
White South Africans have until recently relied on the police and
military to deal quickly with Africans accused of crimes against
the person and property of Whites. This t radi t ional confidence
tends to fade in r e s i d e n t i a l areas close to centers of the
revolutionary upsurge. Whites buy licensed guns and attend
self-defence c lasses in what amounts to a form of pr iva te
policing. Evadne Grant26 argues that "the private security
industry, vigilantism, gangsterism and township injustice are a l l
aspects of the phenomenon of private justice" but the distinction
between public and p r iva te law enforcement i s blurred when
members of the S.S.F. are themselves guilty of violent attacks
against p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s and t h e i r o r g a n i s a t i o n s . The
frequent use of petrol bombs on the houses, offices and cars of
radicals suggests the cu lp r i t s are v ig i l an te s , but they might
also be "hit squads " consisting of state security agencies or
men responsible to the S.S.F.27
In Apr i l 1988 shopkeepers and r e s i d e n t s in H i l lb row,
Johannesburg, threatened to form v i g i l a n t e groups to expel
vagrants from the area by using non-violent methods. A week
later the Conservative Party (C.P.) announced that i t planned to
dispute the leases of Black tenants . In May farmers in the
Greylingstad d i s t r i c t , Transvaal formed a v i g i l a n t e group
following the murder of a loca l White farmer. Alleged
right-wingers petrol bombed a mini bus belonging to workers from
the Sarmcol Workers Co-operative. A group known as "Wit Wolwe"
(White Wolves) claimed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y in September for the
des t ruc t ion of Khot so House, the headquarters of the South
African Council of Churches in Johannesburg.
Barend Hendrik Strydom, a former pol ice o f f i c e r , and the
self-styled leader of the Wit Wolwe, opened fire in November 1988
on Africans relaxing in the i r lunch hour in Strydom Square,
central Pretoria. He killed three and wounded 17 , four of whom
died later of their injuries. He was disarmed without a struggle
by an African bystander, who handed him to the police; and was
sentenced to hang in May 1989 on eight counts of murder, the
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eighth resulting from his shooting of an African women shortly
before the massacre in Strydom Square. In a letter written to
his parents earlier on the day of the shooting, he claimed to be
a combatant in the "third war of freedom".28 He had no legal
justification for the murders, while his alleged political,
motives reflected an unreasoning fear or hatred of Black people.
Many Africans have been murdered, also without legal excuse, by
African vigilantes in some bantustans, but escaped punishment
because they acted under the protective shield of the men in
power, most conspicuously in the so-called "independent
homelands", of which there are four: Transkei, declared
independent on 2 6 October 1976; Bophuthatswana on 6 December
1977; Venda on 13 September 1979; and the Ciskei, a
Xhosa-speaking territory like the Transkei, on 5 December 1981.29
The biggest number of casualties attributed to bantustan
vigilantes came, however, from the non-independent homeland of
KwaZulu in Natal, where the main source of conflict arose from
clashes between Inkatha and members of the U.D.F. Chief
Mangasuthu Buthelezi, Inkatha's president and chief minister of
KwaZulu, claimed that the U.D.F. was trying to push his people
out of Durban and the rural districts of Pietermaritzburg. He
accused it of resorting to widespread acts of violence and
destruction of property, whereas U.D.F. spokesmen put the blame
for the deaths and destruction on Inkatha.
Chief Buthelezi, while rejecting independence for his bantustan,
wanted to have the powers vested in the head of a sovereign
state. He told Adrian Vlok, the Minister of Law and Order, that
his hands were tied by not being in control of the police in
troubled areas. He wanted his administration to take charge of
police stations and have the right to issue firearm licenses.
Seven police stations were accordingly transferred to the KwaZulu
administration in May and June 1987.3 °
Police Culture
The New Nation of 2 February 1990, suggested that a serious
revolt was underway within some sections of the S.A.P. when
called upon to cope with mass resistance to apartheid practices.
"In the last two weeks alone", the journal reported, "police have
been involved in at least three major clashes with demonstrators,
with scores being arrested and a number of deaths reported". A
delegation from the International Commission of Jurists reported
at the end of a fact-finding mission that policemen were
suffering culture shock resulting from the unbanning of their
declared enemies, and should be retrained.31
The policemen's culture is a sub-species of White South African
culture, which is compounded by tradition, hostility, fear and
interdependence. These elements are part of his social heritage,
12
shaped by upbringing, family, friends and fellow policemen, who
are taught that their special mission is to safeguard White
civilisation against Blacks, members of an inferior race destined
by divine decree to draw water and hew wood for the chosen few.
Rank and file policemen the world over use strong-arm methods to
subdue real or imaginary law-breakers. Racism adds a cutting
edge to standard procedures of intimidation. Policemen commonly
manhandle Africans said to be cheeky and aggressive, push and
cuff those who fail to "co-operate" and use violence to extract
alleged "confessions" or other statements admissible in evidence.
If the amount of violence overruns acceptable limits, resulting
in manslaughter or serious torture, the policeman in charge can
depend on fellow officers to stand by him, and on conniving
magistrates who prefer the unconfirmed testimony of a policeman
to the evidence of an accused man or woman.
Nicholas Haysom33 notes that "one of the most glaring features of
the S.A.P. disciplinary record, is its failure to discipline or
expel those of its members who have been guilty of assault or
torture." He quotes Foster and Luyt, whose comparative study
shows that far from facing disciplinary action, several members
of the security forces who have been identified over the years
for having participated in assault or torture have been promoted.
Total War
The notion that the security forces stood outside the law
appeared in a defence White Paper tabled in 1977.34 It claimed
that revolutionaries were preparing a total onslaught on the
republic which called for a "total strategy".
Military chiefs soon relayed the message. General Pienaar,
inspector general of the air force, declared in January 1979 that
since the onslaught was.aimed at all racial groups, all would
have to share the burden. The S.A.D.F. would recruit more Blacks
of whom 4 000 were already serving in the defence force and navy.
Coloured and Indian volunteers for national service would serve
for two years, but for less pay than Whites received.
A large posse of police and soldiers raided Sebokeng, Sharpeville
and Bophelong in the Vaal Triangle on 23 October 1984, arresting
400 men and woman for pass offenses and other minor breeches of
the law. Critics accused the government of carrying out an
old-style assault on Africans under the pretext of a military
exercise, known as "Operat ion Palmiet". Magnus Maian retorted
that the police and army acted together to safeguard the
republic. To legitimise his claim, the Defence Amendment Act,
1984 (amending the Defence Act of 1957 ) authorised soldiers to do
the work of policemen in matters relating to defence against
terrorism, internal disorder and the protection of essential
services.
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Louis Le Grange, the Law and Order Minister, visited Sebokeng and
Sharpeville in October 1984 after the "Palmiet" operation and
blamed the U.D.F. for the outbreak of violence in the Vaal
Triangle. He accused it of mobilising students and trade unions
to further aims which were the same as those of the A.N.C. and
Communist Party, who were preparing a revolutionary climate. The
words he used would later form the substance of indictments in
the Pietermaritzburg and Delmas treason trials.
A commission headed by Jannie Geldenhuys, chief of the S.A.D.F.
was appointed on the 30 March 1984 to investigate conditions in
the defence force and armaments industry. The commission
reported two years later that one of the S.A.D.F.'s aims was to
involve all population groups in the country's defence with full
recognition of human dignity. Its policy was based on the
principle that all inhabitants were responsible for their defence
"within the limits of existing provisions of the law". To this
effect, it had increasingly relied on manpower resources other
than White males, "on whom it had earlier relied exclusively".3 5
The call-up would be extended to Coloureds and Indians if their
parliamentary representatives agreed. Coloureds had been fully
included in the S.A.D.F. since 1963. Volunteers signed up for
two years, the period served by White conscripts, and were posted
to border regions for training with the Cape Corps. Selected
members were then posted to Namibia, to serve with the citizen
force in the "operational area". African servicemen were
absorbed by the defence forces in the "independent bantustans".
More than 35 000 soldiers were deployed during 1985 in 96
townships to support the S.A.P. S.A.D.F. spokesmen explained
that there were practical reasons why the police could not be
used in large numbers to repress resistors in residential areas.
Adrian Vlok, the Deputy Minister of Defence, warned that if the
military, most of whom were national service conscripts were
withdrawn, residents would murder one another on an unknown
scale. In July. 1989, speaking in his new role of Law and Order
Minister, he put the blame on apartheid, saying it had become an
albatross around the country's neck. "If you ask a Black South
African what apartheid has done, he will say it has caused
nothing but grief. . . If we do not get rid of it, it will crucify
us all."3 6
Conscription
Many Whites shared his opinion and showed their opposition to the
call up by leaving the country or refusing compulsory military
service, which, until recently lasted for two years (reduced in
1990 to one year), followed by 720 days spread over 12 years.
Laurie Nathan37 traces the emergence of war resistance in the
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mid-1970s to the "intensifying struggle of national liberation
and the S.A.D.F.'s increasingly prominent role in South Africa
and Southern Africa" (at p. 309).
Conscription was first introduced in 1967, and some Whites have
refused to serve since then. The Defence Act of 1957 orders
objectors to perform community service for one and a half times
the length of the call-up. An amending act of 1987 provides that
objectors will not be in a more favourable position than men
doing their national service.
Twenty three men announced in August 1987 that they had taken a
pledge to refuse national service and instead devote themselves
to building a South Africa of peace and harmony. Members of the
group, which included university students, former S.A.D.F.
officers, and men waiting for call-up, declared that the root of
the civil war in South Africa was apartheid, which bred violence
and hatred. The army authorities replied that failure to report
for military service was a crime.
Dr Ivan Toms, a member of the group was called up on the 12
November 198 7 and refused to serve. The Wynberg regional court
in Cape Town sentenced him to the maximum possible term of
imprisonment of one year and nine months. A former lieutenant in
the S.A.D.F., he had argued the case for refusing to serve in the
S.A.D.F. at public meetings: it occupied Namibia illegally, waged
war on neighbouring states, engaged in civil war in South Africa
in defence of apartheid and occupied townships detaining,
torturing and killing South Africans who were fighting for
freedom.
The discontent among young Whites from liberal, middle-class
homes with religious convictions found an outlet in the End
Conscription Campaign. (E.C.C. ) 3 s Formed in 1983, it set up
branches in six cities and appealed for support for its campaign
to end conscription, remove troops from townships and withdraw
the S.A.D.F. from Namibia and Angola. An associated body, the
Committee on South African War Resistance (COSWAR), which was
based in London, claimed to have helped more than 300 draft
dodgers to obtain political assylum in Britain, and another 400
in Holland.
A correspondent in the African Communist,39 writing under the
pen-name "Cato", argued that the E.C.C. was one of the most
effective anti-apartheid organisations among Whites, and that it
was banned for this reason on 24 August 1988. The ban did not,
however, deter the E.C.C. from asking the supreme court for an
injunction to restrain the S.A.D.F. from dropping abusive
pamphlets from a helicopter on E.C.C. gatherings. The Air Force
chief, General van Loggenberg, responded by pleading that the
action taken was a "necessary military measure" in a state of war
in which the courts had no jurisdiction over the military. Mr
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Justice S. Selikowitz found that the spreading of false
information about the E.C.C. went beyond lawful opposition and
granted the restraining order.
The S.A.D.F. could not solve its serious manpower scaricity by
calling up women, Goloureds or Indians. Africans were a
potential recruiting source, but the possibility of recruiting
them involved issues of citizenship, voting rights and the
bantustans. The military had managed to recruit about 20 000
Black troops. Though amounting to fewer than 5% of the total
number of troops on hand, they were important in front-line
combat in the operational area and a symbol of the government's
stated aim of winning the hearts and minds of all races.
Black Troops in the S.A.D.F.
The National Manpower Commission said in February 1989 that the
S.A.D.F. would have to make increasing use of Black groups.
Military service was a heavy burden on the White population,
which supplied most of the skilled manpower in all fields of
activity. To reduce the shortage, "various population groups
would have to be utilised to a greater extent in the future".
Brigadier J Bosman, the former information officer of the
S.A.D.F. told parliament in May 1989 that Blacks formed one third
of the 3 000 troops in South Africa's operation in South-East
Angola. More than 65% of the soldiers in the fighting zone were
"people of colour".
In 1987 the army accepted applications from 2 232 Africans, 122
Coloureds and 18 Indians, but rejected all applications by Blacks
to join the Air Force. Regional battalions of Africans were
established in non-independent bantustans: at Amsterdam for the
Swazi, Letaba Ranch for the Shangaan, Messina for the Northern
Sotho and Dukuduku for the Zulu. As for the "independent"
homelands, the Transkei Defence Force was reputed to have fewer
than 3 000 troops; 1 000 were being trained in Venda; and
Bophuthatswana's military strength was estimated at 1 500.40
Bantustan Upheavals
Political unrest in the homelands must cast serious doubt on
their ability, if not their willingness, to reinforce South
Africa's military might. Some appear to be looking to a reformed
South Africa for an escape from their economic and political
difficulties, others insist on their full "sovereignty".
In the Transkei, the first and most highly prized "independent"
bantu homeland, wrangling between Kaizer Matanzima, the former
state president, and his brother George led along tortuous paths
to the uncontested coup by General Bantu Holomisa, chairman of
the Transkei Military Council, on 30 December, 1987.
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In the Ciskei, a power struggle between President Lennox Sebe and
his brother Charles, forced Charles to flee with his retainers
into exile in the Trans kei. On or about March 10, 1990,
Brigadier Oupa Gqozo overthrew Lennox, who reportedly went into
exile on a farm outside Pretoria.
In Venda students accused senior officials of ritual killings and
demanded the dismissal of the Minister of Justice, said to have
been involved. In March, 1990 the administration was brought to
a stand-still by strikes of magistrates, police, teachers and
workers in essential services. A military take-over followed a
month later.
In Gazankulu 2 4 people died in March during three weeks of
rioting when the army backed by the S.A.D.F. attempted to crush a
popular revolt in which the home and shop of Hudson Ntsamwisi,
the Chief Minister, was burnt to the ground.41
In Bophuthatswana, the S.A.D.F. came to the rescue of President
Mangope after a coup that toppled him on 10 February 1989. He
survived in the face of massive resistance; and claimed that the
territory would remain independent "even after 100 years". His
optimism suffered a shock when work stoppages took place, civil
servants threatened a general strike and members of the
opposition took to the streets under an A.N.C. banner. The
government declared a state of emergency on March 7 , 1990,
detained opposition groups, and launched a campaign against the
A.N.C., COSATU and their allies. During Mangope's absence in
Europe, the government declared a desire to take part in the
negotiation process. Three members of the cabinet and
representatives of the A.N.C. national executive met for the
first time to consider possibilities of integration in South
African structures.
The tumults that broke out from time to time in the small,
overcrowded tribal homelands are like tips of icebergs, the great
mass of which lies beneath the surface. Every homeland has a
structure of its own, different from that of the others, but they
have features in common. One is the imposition of "independence"
by the apartheid government in Pretoria against the wishes of the
majority and sowing the seeds of revolt. Another is the
prevailing condition of underdevelopment, backwardness and
dependence on White South Africa for economic aid and political
support. The formal autonomy conferred on the tribal homelands
is severely limited by the high degree of their integration in
the structures of the super-state, whose security laws and
repressive regime are models on which they draw1.
Some ambitious chiefs, aspiring to a leading position at the
negotiating table and top levels of power politics, attempt to
break out of the dependency strait-jacket by using their ethnic
base as a springboard for a clamorous nationalist movement.
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Jonas Savimbi of Unita in Angola and Gatsha Buthelezi of Inkatha
in Natal are outstanding examples of tribal leaders who fight
their way to the top through violence and destruction.
Mzala,42 the author of a critical but fair-minded account, of
Chief Buthelezi's conflicting roles - as head of a bantustan and
alleged freedom fighter - suggests that "Perhaps the most
controversial aspect of Chief Buthelezi's is his claim to be a
man of peace and that the Inkatha movement is a non-violent
organisation. The latter posit ion is increasingly untenable.
The large-scale involvement of many members of Inkatha, even
including manny office-bearers, in acts of violence in Natal is
an undeniable fact." (at p. 232 )
Mzala goes on to pose the question: "Can a man of peace remain
associated with a movement involved in violent atrocities?" The
correct answer is "Yes!", provided that he takes up arms in a
"just cause". Taking part in a revolutionary struggle against an
evil system like apartheid is compatible with a rejection of
violence on ethical grounds. This is the position of the
A.N.C.'s MK guerillas, or conscientious objectors, or clergymen
who minister to soldiers on active service. The flaw in
Buthelezi's political philosophy arises from his insistence on an
aggressive Zulu nationalism in his drive for political power and
disregard of the liberation movement's call for one South Africa,
one people, one nation!
One Citizenship
In his opening address to parliament on 31 January 1986, the
State President P W Botha said that South Africa had outgrown
colonial paternalism and discarded apartheid. The society was
multi-cultural and needed a sharing of power with protection of
minority rights against domination of any one group. He intended
to conduct negotiations for the creation of a national council
for Africans, which he would chair, enabling them to take part in
government at an executive level.
His proposals for constitutional development included an
undivided South Africa (without the "independent homelands"); one
citizenship for all South Africans; equality before the law,
protection of civil rights of all citizens, regardless of their
colour, race or religion; a democratic system of government which
would enable all communities to fulfill their legitimate
political aspirations; and the recognition of a right vested in
every South African to take part in government through elected
representatives.
This reform policy repeated promises contained in the "Rubicon"
speech to the N.P. congress in Durban on 15 August , 198 5 , in
which, contrary to expectations, he failed to announce major
reforms. On both occasions he made the fatal mistake of denying
Africans full participation in the parliamentary system.
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Government spokesmen admitted that the continued revolutionary
upsurge was rooted in the poverty and depressed socio-economic
conditions of the bulk of Africans. The reform programme,
according to senior members of the cabinet, would tackle the
problems involved in raising the living standards of Africans in
urban communities to an acceptable level. Priority had to be
given, however, to the task of restoring public order in
townships. It was for this reason that P W Botha as State
President declared a state of emergency in the whole country
under his jurisdiction on 12 June 1986.
Repression and Reform
Reform and repression are necessary ingredients of the "total
strategy" put forward for public consumption in a defence White
Paper in 1977. Swilling and Phillips summarised the concept in
the following passage:
"Total strategy was defined as involving the
co-ordination with all the means available to the state
of the military, economic, psychological, political,
sociological, diplomatic, cultural and ideological
fields of state activity. It was further argued that
South Africa was the target of a "total onslaught", and
therefore required a "total strategy" capable of
combining effective security measures with reformist
policies aimed at removing the grievances that
revolutionaries could exploit."44
"Government spokesmen during the year stated that S.A.
could be viewed as being in an undeclared state of war.
General M. Malan, Chief of the Defence Force, was quoted
as saying that the requirements of a total strategy and
a democratic system of government conflicted. He called
on South Africans to be prepared to pay the price of
their survival. "If we do not understand that we are in
- a struggle for survival) we will not be able to make the
sacrifices which are necessary."45
The public's response to Botha1s dualism reflected the width of
the gulf between the revolutiona'ries and the White supremacists.
The A.N.C. declared that 1986 was the year of its armed wing.
Umkhonto we Sizwe, called for a people's war and undertook to
step up military assaults on apartheid structures in answer to
Pretoria's counter-revolutionary offensive.
Far-right racists denounced "power sharing" with Blacks and
called for a return to Verwordian apartheid. Dr Treurnicht, head
of the C.P., threatened to organise a White resistance movement
if the State President brought Africans into parliament.
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The pro-government Afrikaans press* 46 claimed that the emergency
regulations were highly successful in reducing the death toll,
the incidence of violent assaults and "necklacing" in African
townships, where conditions were returning to normal. Listing
the reforms carried out or promised, the authors of the survey
singled out the removal of the ban on inter-racial sex and
marriage, influx controls, discrimination against African trade
unions, job reservation, restrictions on the movement of Indians,
and the Prohibition of Political Interference Act of 1968. The
argument of left-wing radicals that the Botha reforms were
"cosmetic" had a hollow ring and was often simply malicious or
hateful, the more so when one considers the support that
President Botha forfeited to the Afrikaner right wing, (at p. 63)
The Reforms at Work
Some changes were a natural consequence of the 1984 constitution,
under which Coloured and Indian voters were represented in
separate houses like Whites in parliament.
One such change was the repeal in 1985 of the Prohibition of
Mixed Marriages Act and of S.16 of the Immorality Act of 1957,
thus legalising marriage and sex between Whites and Blacks. The
U.D.F., Azanian People's Organisation, and some other interested
bodies belittled the change, saying it was cosmetic or window
dressing; but its significance was far greater. Not only were
close on 500 men and women convicted annualy of inter-racial sex
crimes, but about 1 000 underwent the degrading experience of
applying to a board of White men for a reclassification of their
racial category, of which there were at least seven. The
classification took place in terms of the Population Registration
Act of 1950 - one of the first statutes enacted by the apartheid
government which took office in 1948. The Human Sciences
Research Council reported in October 1985 that population
registration was effectively a race classification device, which
had given rise to a number of racial laws with negative effects
on group relations, and identified Whites in such a way as to
make them supreme at the constitutional level .4 7
Freedom of choice in marriage is inconsistent with rigid class,
caste or religious distinctions. When status is closely linked,
as in South Africa, to racial type, any degree of assimilation
that blurs the obvious physical differences is seen as a threat
to the social order. The dominant White group applies a strong
pressure to maintain race "purity".
* One of the authors, Alf Ries, is assistant editor and
political reporter of Die Burger. The other, Ebbe
Dommisse, is Die Burger's editor.
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The Nationalist-Labour "Pact" government of 1924 introduced an
Immoralty Act in 1927 that banned illicit sex between Whites and
Africans, thereby imposing the first statutory restriction on the
freedom of White men to have sex with African women. A ban on
marriages between Whites and "non-Europeans" followed in L949.
In 1950 parliament prohibited sex outside of marriage between a
"European" and a "non-European", the latter being defined as "a
person who in appearance obviously is, or who by general
acceptance and repute is non-European". The equivocal wording
makes no mention of ancestry, the skeleton in the cupboard of
Whites who share a common stock with Blacks.
The Immorality Act of 193 7 reverted to the terminology of the
Boer Republics which outlawed "illicit" sex between "White" and
"Coloured" (or kleurling in the Afrikaans version, which applied
to all Blacks). Plunging more deeply into legal obscurantism,
the legislature defined a "Coloured" as any person other than a
"White person", and White as "any person who in appearance is
obviously, or by general acceptance and report is a White
person".4 8
Let it be noted that the Dutch Reform Church (N.G.K.), formerly a
staunch opponent of "mixed" marriages and sex between White and
Black, relented when President Botha became leader of the reform
movement. The 1986 synod of the N.G.K. declared that racism is a
grievous sin and "scripture does not prohibit racially mixed
marriages".4 9
Another consequential change was the repeal in 1985 of the
Prohibition of Political Interference Act of 1968, which
prohibition non-racial political parties. The Progressive Party
"under protest and under compulsion" had decided to confine its
membership to Whites. With this barrier to open membership
removed, political parties were able to admit members of all
races. Radicals welcomed the reform as an important advance to
integration, but the Progressive Federal Party, generally
regarded as the main beneficiary of the reform, suffered severe
setbacks which resulted in its dissolution in 1989, its members
being absorbed in the newly formed Democratic Party.
Urban Growth, Pass Laws and Influx Control
Of greater structural significance was the government's decision
to recognise that the urbanisation of Africans was inevitable,
and their residence in "white" South Africa (exclusive of the
bantu homelands) permanent. Like other citizens, Africans had a
right to freedom of movement to and within towns and cities. The
President, P W Botha, had the courage to grasp the nettle of
rabid White intolerance by reversing the century old policy of
shutting the door on African workseekers. As I noted in 196S:50
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"The townward flow is the outcome of more than 100 years
of colonial wars, expropriation of tribal territory,
taxation, labour recruiting and other influences that
compelled peasants to leave their rural homes for
employment on farms, mines and industrial enterprises.
Yet governments and the dominant section of Whites have
never reconciled themselves to the permanent settlement
of African families in the towns. Farmers and mine
owners, competing for labour, ratepayers reluctant to
subsidize housing, labour leaders, apprehensive of
competition, White supremacists, afraid of a large Black
proletariat - all agreed that the towns are "White man's
counry", in which Africans intrude as aliens to serve
the White man's interests." (In the words of M.C.
Botha, Deputy Minister of Bantu Education and
Development, speaking on 24 February 19 64 : "It is policy
to exclude those who are illegally resident, redundant,
work-shy, idle or undesirable.")
As from 23 April 1986, African citizens had freedom of movement
in White South Africa. Instead of closing the door on them, the
government would have to use the state's resources to "promote
orderly urbanisation" contemplated in the "White Paper on
Urbanisation" published in April 1986. Two acts of parliament
prepared the way for momentous change: the Identification Act and
the Abolition of Influx Control Act, both enacted in 1986.
Described as the first legislative step towards the scrapping of
influx controls, Blacks (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of
Documents) Act of 1952, a pernicious piece of legislation with a
grossly misleading title. It required all Africans aged 16 and
over to carry passes co-ordinated in a reference book, applicants
for which were finger-printed.
The 1986 Act stipulates that the records in the reference bureau
would become part of the population register containing the
records of all South Africans, who have to identify themselves on
demand by producing their identity book or other document issued
by the state.
Identity books issued to Africans under the new arrangement are
outwardly the same as those held by other South Africans. Though
not mentioned in the legislation, race classification appears in
the register which draws on information contained in birth
certificates.
Race classification continues under the Population Act. In 1987,
918 people applied to be reclassified from one race group to
another, the total number of recognised groups being seven:
African, Coloured, Chinese, Griqua, Indian, Malay and White.
Some members of the House of Representatives complain of the
absurdity and harmful effects of the system. Peter Hendrickse, a
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Labour Party M.P., introduced a motion in February 1989 that
proposed the repeal of section 5 of the Act, which requires
racial classification. He blamed its persistence on the National
Party's "almost pathological obsession regarding race and the
purity of race"; and complained of the hurt, degradation and
suffering it caused. Mr Ishmael Essop, a fellow M.P., cited his
family's experience to illustrate the absurdity of race
classification according to appearance and life style. He was
placed in the Malay group, two of his brothers in the Coloured
group, one in the White, two sisters were classified Coloured and
a third Indian.5l
Influx Controls Scrapped
The abolition of the Influx Control Act of 1986 was passed in
June (but effectively backdated to 2 3 April). It repealed,
wholly or in part, 34 laws, and amended three others.52 Among
those repealed was the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of
1945, the centerpiece of influx control. Section 10, the most
vicious clause in the act, had made it an offence for Africans to
remain in prescribed Areas, i.e. where control was in force, for
longer than 72 hours. The prohibition, said J A van den Heever53
in 1954 is:
"directed prima facie against all natives . . . against
millions of persons on the grounds of race and exempts
only a relatively small number, who can be usefully or
satisfactorily be absorbed in the economic life of the
urban community."
Because of P W Botha's reform policy, Africans with an approved
I.D. could enter a town or city in "White" dominated South Africa
and move about freely. Thousands took advantage of the new
freedom of movement and streamed into urban areas looking for
jobs and shelter. Work seekers without means of support ran the
risk of being treated as vagrants and squatters under amendments
to the Slums Act of 1979 and the Prevention of Illegal Squatting
Act of 1951.
The National Committee against Removals (N.C.A.R.)54 welcomed the
scrapping of influx control but pointed out that the major shift
in policy was away from racial discrimination towards economic
differentiation, which favoured people who could afford to live
in urban areas. "With the combined effect of changes to the
Prevention of Illegal. Squatting Act of 1951, the Slums Act of
1979, health regulations, the Group Areas Act of 1966, the
policing by local authorities, and the limited land set aside for
urbanisation, control over the movement of people to urban areas
could almost be as tight as under the pass laws."
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Housing Costs and Scarcities55
Freedom of movement carried with it no guarantee of jobs or
housing, but African work-seekers streamed into towns and cities,
trusting to luck, kinsmen and their ability to overcome obstacles
to a settled family life. According to the Human Sciences
Research Council (H.S.R.C.) estimates released in February 1989
the urban African population would rise from 7.6m (in 1980) to
15.5m (in 1990) and 26.2m in the year 2 000. About 60% of the
increase in recent years resulted from natural growth rather than
migration.
Specialists in the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
(C. S. I . R. ) reported that at the end of 1985 6.3m Africans were
crammed into about 486 000 small dwellings, an average of 13 per
house, in "white" South Africa. The worst case of overcrowding
discovered was in Uitenhage in the Eastern Cape, where 42
Africans lived in a two-roomed house. The shortage of houses for
Africans at the existing rate of building would increase from
2.1m to 3.4m in 2000.
Cost was a major obstacle in the policy of doing away with the
housing scarcity. The country's economy would have to grow at
the rate of 17% a year to eliminate the backlog by the year 2000.
the existing rate was only 3% p.a. Banks, building societies and
state institutions were unwilling to make money available to
lower income people for morgage loans. Only 2 5% of African
families could make a significant contribution to housing costs.
Consequently, housing development for Africans was determined by
the demands of a growing middle class. Building plans submitted
for approval were for the more expensive class of homes, and
hardly at all for members of the sub-economic group which
included three-quarters of the population.
Squatting, Slums, Group Areas
The government' s policy on "informal settlement", the new name
given to squatting, had two aims. One was to provide
sub-standard housing for squatters - people living on shacks on
land unlawfully occupied. Mr Henry Klotz,56 the Mayor of Durban,
speaking in August 1988, gave an excellent description of the
shelters in which nearly half the number of people in greater
Durban were living. They varied from backyard rooms and garages,
through houses of mud or plywood, to car wrecks and plastic bags.
The other- aim was to tighten control over squatting and
"disorderly" urbanisation which, the government said, had spread
since the repeal of the pass laws. For this purpose) the
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act, which amended the
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951, was introduced in
parliament in 1988. The House of Assembly passed it in
September, but the House of Representatives and the House of
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Delegates strongly rejected the bill, which extended the
prohibition of "illegal squatting" to include the occupation of
unauthorised buildings and land without the owner's consent.
There were other objectionable clauses, one being a provision
that persons accused of squatting would be presumed guilty until
they had proven their innocence. The amending legislation was
submitted to the President's Council. It gave its approval in
November 1988, and P W Botha signed the bill on 8 February,
1989.57
Much the same thing happened to three bills tabled in parliament
in June 1988 to amend the Group Areas Act of 1966. Chris Heunis,
the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, claimed
that the aim was to strengthen the hands of officials by
increasing penalties for buying, selling or occupying property
in violation of the 1966 act. The court's were instructed to
order the eviction of an "illegal occupant" after conviction.
The P.F.P. estimated that 200 000 black people were living
illegally in white areas who would be affected by the
legislation. Mr Mohamed Dangor, a spokesman for the Action
Committee to Stop Evictions (ACTSTOP). said, "The new amendment
has a clear political message, 'Apartheid is alive and well.'"5s
The Labour Party refused to discuss the bills in the House of
Representatives and adjourned the House.
Mr F W de Klerk, the Minister of National Education and the
chairman of the Ministers' Council in the Assembly threatened to
move a suspension of parliamentary rules, but subsequently backed
down. A revised version of the bill was put forward, but the
house of Delegates and Representatives stuck their heels in and
refused to approve. The State President P W Botha refered the
bill to the Presidents' Council (P.C.), which returned it for
redrafting. In his address to parliament in February 1989, the
Acting State President, Mr Chris Heunis, 5 9 said that the
government had decided to abandon the bill and investigate other
methods of safeguarding the "own community life" of each race
group.
In the meantime, while ministers and the P.C. were debating their
next strategy, officials used group areas regulations to harass
"mixed marriage" couples, even though the ban on inter-racial sex
and marriage had been removed by parliament in June 1985.
Parties to a "mixed marriage" could not live legally in any group
area without a permit or reclassification. The extraordinary
case of Mr Palkowich,60 a White man married to an Indian, and
living with his wife in his house in Kempton Park, zoned as a
White area, caught the public's eye. The husband was
reclassified Asian on his marriage and then charged with
accommodating his wife in a White area and alternatively living
unlawfully as an "Asian" in his house. The couple applied for a
permit, which was refused. In October 1988, the couple appeared
in the Kempton Park Magistrate's Court on charges of contravening
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the Group Areas Act- Professor John Dugard, the director of the
Centre for Applied Legal Studies at the University of the
Witwatersrand, spoke in their defence. He challenged the
validity of the proclamation making Kempton Park a White group
area, because it denied the Christian values and norms affirmed
by the South African Constitution Act of 1983. The magistrate,
Mrs Greyvenstein, referred the case to the Supreme Court,
whereupon the Transvaal Provincial Administrator intervened by
granting the desired permit enabling the Palkowich family to live
in Kempton Park.
The Reform of Labour Relations
A resurgent African working class, supported by a number of
international agencies, demanded the repeal of industrial colour
bars, the discrimination imposed against Africans by the
Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956.61
The appointment of the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry into labour
laws in 1977 was the first taken by the government towards a new
pattern of labour relations. Professor N E Wiehahn, head of the
Institute of Labour Relations at the University of South Africa,
set out to "deracialise" the labour laws and encourage vertical
labour mobility. African unions, he pointed out, were a
component part of industrial life and could no longer be brushed
aside. Their members were a majority of the urban work force,
but had no say in the industrial councils that allocated surplus
value among the various claimants. Such a "paternalistic" system
of decision making, he argued, infringed international standards.
The Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, 94 of 1979, which
arose out of the commission's report, together with the Labour
Relations Act, 57 of 1924, which excluded Africans from the
system of"collective bargaining applicable to Whites, Coloureds
and Indians. Act 57 of 1981 - labelled the Labour Relations Act
of 1987, as though to wipe out the memory of the shameful
Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 - made a clean sweep of
discriminatory clauses, usually by simply deleting the racial
terms. A new definition of "employee" included all African
workers, other than farm workers, domestic servants and public
servants, as "any person who is employed by or working for any
employer, receiving or entitled to receive remuneration."
The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956, so crudely absorbed by
the 1981 Act, was a wholly destructive measure. It segregated
the unions according to race and gave Whites sheltered employment
with a monopoly of preferred jobs that lasted for more than 20
years. Ray and Jack Simons wrote a booklet62 at the time when
the Act was being hotly debated and pointed out that race
discrimination had been undermined by changes in material
conditions. White workers, who shared the advantages of the
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dominant race, had an interest in maintaining its privileges,
"Loyalty to the White race rates higher and is made more
rewarding than class loyalties".
Ray and I rejected White "baassleap" in the unions with a "mixed"
membership, and urged Coloureds and Indians to form seperate
unions under their own leadership. The Trade Union Council of
S-A. (Tucsa) objected to our stand, as did radical members of the
liberation movement who wanted mixed unions to deregister. For
these reasons we published the pamphlet at our own expense.
We met with another round of objections in 1979-81 from leading
militants who argued that the labour law reforms were "cosmetic",
whereas we thought that they brought about a qualitative change
for the better.63 We set out a more detailed study of the
Wiehahn Commission and the legislation resulting from its
recommendations in a paper published in 1987 by the International
Labour Office, Geneva under the title "One Hundred Years of Job
Reservation on the South African Mines."
The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)
Cosatu was conceived at a unity summit held in Langa, Cape Town,
in August 1981. Negotiations between progressive unions for the
formation of a single centre continued for four years until
agreement was reached between trade unions and general unions
attached to the U.D.F.
Ray Alexander Simons, writing under the pen name "R S Nyameki" ,6 •*
recorded the events leading to the formation of COSATU, and noted
that:
"A big contribution to the formation of COSATU was made
by the successful stay-away in the Transvaal of 5-7
N o v e m b e r 1984 when trade u n i o n s , c o m m u n i t y
organisations, boycotting students and scholars joined
forces and paralysed South Africa's industrial heartland
for two days with the most effective work stay-away in
the country's history."
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 'This stay-away demonstrated the need for the working
class to come together and fight as a people, because
you could not say that the struggle in the factory was
different from the struggle in the community* explained
Chris Dlamini, President of FOSATU (now merged in
COSATU)."
COSATU was formed in Durban on 30 December 1985 during the state
of emergency declared on July 21, 1985. Elijah Barayi,
Vice-President of the National Union of Mineworkers (N.U.M. ) , was
elected the President of COSATU. Cyril Ramaphosa, the General
Secretary of N.U.M., opened the Durban conference with the
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ringing words "A giant is born". He told the 900 delegates
present, representing 600 000 members from 36 unions, that P W
Botha's government had failed and should resign. "We workers
should seize power and build a new society." He called on P W
Botha to lift the state of emergency, and withdraw all troops
from the townships immediately, unban political organisations and
individuals, dismantle the bantustans, scrap the pass laws within
six months, or face mass defiance.
Corruption in High Places
Ries and Dommisse66 suggest that the N.P., after being in power
for 40 years, understandably shows signs of a hardening of the
moral arteries. They quoted Baren Du Plessis, the Minister of
Finance, as saying in his budget speech on 15 March 1988 that
bribery, corruption, illegal dealing in financial rands, price
manipulation and consumer exploitation, were being practised by
crooks and frauds for the enrichment of the few at the expense of
the many.
As though to bear him out, cases of alleged corruption hit the
headlines from June 1988 onwards . The main areas of theft,
embezzlement or fraud - euphemistically called "irregularities" -
were the Department of Development and Training (DET), the
Transkei "independent" bantustan, Peet de Pontes, Nationalist
M.P. for East London, and the operations of the "hit squads"
organised by military chief officers.
The DET irregularities involved Braam Fourie, the Director
General and his deputy, Mr Meiring, who paid R4.8m for computers
purchased from a firm in which Mr Fourie's son had an interest.
Mr Jaap Strydom, another Deputy Director of the DET, was said to
have acquired books, magazines and posters for the department
from a company in which his son Thinus had an interest.
A commission headed by Mr Justice Louis Harms was appointed in
August 1988 to investigate irregularities in the " independent"
bantustans of Transkei and Ciskei. This followed the coup in
December 1987 and the installation of a military council led by
Maj Gen Bantu Holomisa who declared martial law and suspended the
Transkei's constitution. Two commissions which tabled their
reports after the downfall of the Matanzima brothers and the
collapse of Miss Sigcau's government investigated the misuse of
public funds believed to total some R120m.
One of these commissions, headed by Mr G A Alexander, was told in
evidence that two former mayors of Cape Town, Abe Bloomberg and
his son David, were key figures behind ESL, a company formed to
promote gambling ventures in the Transkei and transmit monies
abroad. His report, presented on 4 July, 1988, referred to a
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"grotesque pattern of corruption in high places", and recommended
that all recipients of money acquired corruptly be forced to
"disgorge their ill-gotten gains" .
The Harms Commission began its hearings in Gape Town in September
1988 . On 17 January 1989 Mr Sol Kerzner, Managing Director of
Sun International, whose headquarters were in Bophut hats wana,
admitted in an affidavit that he had paid R2m for the personal
benefit of Chief George Matanzima to ensure exclusive casino
rights in the Transkei, rights already held by Sun International
subsidiaries. "Under undue pressure form the Prime Minister
George Matanzima, R2m of the funds available were...paid into the
account of Mr G J Gouws for the ultimate benefit of Chief
George." Mr David Blomberg submitted an identical affidavit. Mr
Kerzner subsequently resigned from the boards of Sun
International and its associated companies.
Mr Douw Steyn, Pretoria's Ambassador in the Ciskei, told the
commission in November 1988 that corruption and financial
mismanagement in the Ciskei enabled millions of rands to be
siphoned off by foreigners. Ciskeian officials were open to
bribery. He had been dismissed in March 1988 on the grounds of
the Ciskei's financial position, and testified to the commission
in the matter of Mr Peet de Pontes, the Nationalist M.P. for East
London, who abused his political position to secure permanent
residence in the Ciskei for his former business partner, Mr Vito
Roberto Palazzola, an Italian convicted of drug smuggling who was
serving a prison sentence in Switzerland. They were partners in
a company called Papillon International which siphoned off funds
into ventures proposed by de Pontes, including a bank in the
Ciskei agreed to by Chief Sebe.
CCB, Hit Squads and Assasinations
The Harms Commission of Inquiry into Certain Alleged Murders
suffered from severe constraints. Nigel Claxton, whose TV film
entitled "Apartheid Assassins" won the gold medal for the best
documentary special in New York's Film and Television Festival in
1990, called the Commission fs inquiry an "exercise in damage
control" and "an expensive whitewash". Despite those failings,
the Special Report issued by the Human Rights Commission in
association with the David Webster Trust in September 1990 found
that the evidence placed before the Commission painted a picture
of "a chilling and deadly group of men, acting,as if with
complete impunity from the law".
The Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) which arose out of a dispute
between B J Vorster, the former State President and his successor
P W Botha, became a many-sided organisation, committed among
other things to the elimination of the government's opponents
within and outside of the R.S.A.
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General Eddie Webb, chairman of the CCB since the begining of
1989, and up to the time of its formal dissolution on i August
1990, told the Harms Commission that the CCB' s main target was
Whites who supported tha A.N.C. By placing A.N.C. members and
supporters under the S.A.D.F.'s jurisdiction the military could
order their elimination.
The military gradually played an increasingly aggressive role
against the A.N.C, P.A.C., S.A.C.P. and White activists, making
them targets for harassment and then assassination outside the
law. The CCB provided a civil law facade for these illegal
activities, but the S.A.D.F. remained in control, and was kept
informed of them before and after the operations. "The argument
was that the S.A.D.F. and therefore the state committed the acts
and that in the execution of organised projets we would not be
prosecuted considering that the country was locked into an
internal war situation." (at p. 6)
The Human Rights Commission put the blame for this on the
shocking web of deceipt and lawlessness of top-ranking S.A.D.F.
officers, cabinet ministers and public servants. The list
included Magnus Malan, Adrian Vlok, General Jannie Geldenhuys,
Chief of the Defence Force, General "Kat" Liebenberg, Chief of
the Army, General "Witkop" Badenhorst, Chief of Staff Operations,
General Joep Joubert, formerly in command of the special forces,
and men in charge of the CCB at one time or another: S taal
Burger, Christo Brits and Joe Verster.
The final responsibility lay with President Botha, head of the
state and the armed forces. He treated the military as a
government within a government, able to run covert operations
while Botha dealt with the objectionable aspects of its
activities without interference from other departments. Awkward
questions could always be answered with the blanket assertion
that operations were "very sensitive" (at p.24)
There was no parlimentary control over the CCB or its
expenditure. It spent millions of rands to set itself up and
finance its operations but never reported its accounts to
parliament. Only the Auditor-General had access to them, and he
had no choice but to accept whatever explanation was dished up by
the military.
They have been in effective control of the country for a long
time, acting through the State Security Council, the key figures
of which included P W Botha, Magnus Malan, Louis le Grange, Kobie
Kotzee and R F "Pik" Botha. When the Security Intelligence and
State Security Act was enacted in 1972, the SSC rose from its
role of unofficial advisor to become an important arm of the
state. It assumed supreme control in the later 1970s, during the
"Muldergate" scandal, which played into P W Botha's hands.
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Nigel Claxton said he was not surprised General Neethling lost
his libel suit against the Vrye Weekblad. Claxton called for a
"fully independent inquiry to expose the truth behind the death
squads". The government has in fact appointed a commission.
Whether it will be fully independent remains to be seen.
Meanwhile, the men of the CCB are still in control of the defence
and police forces. As public servants, they are bound by
tradit ion and the constitution to take their orders from the
government of the day. Will they remain loyal to it, or switch
their allegiance to the racists who threaten civil war in defence
of White supremacy?
The answer li.es with the liberation forces, the resistance
movement, the patriots who gave their lives and freedom to defend
the common society and achieve a single, united South Africa,
with votes for all South Africans in a single, multi-party and
democratic parliament.
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